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In political philosophy Isaiah Berlin’s 
work is often cited for its coherent 
identification of plural values. In “Two 
Concepts of Liberty,” Berlin highlights 
this pluralism that exists between values 
by way of negative and positive liberty. 
In negative liberty individuals have “the 
freedom from,” and in positive liberty 
individuals have “the freedom to.” While a 
differentiation may seem inconsequential 
at first, Berlin recognizes that in expressing 
one of these values the other value may be 
sacrificed; the freedom from interference 
may restrict some from fully realizing their 
goals and vice versa. If this is the case but 
both values are still deemed valuable, how 
does one decide which to choose? 
What Berlin and other liberal pluralists 
like William Galston want to say, - is that 
despite values being incomparable and/
or incommensurable, there is a minimum 
requirement of negative liberty that is 
a necessary accompaniment to value 
pluralism. Choices can be made between 
negative and positive liberty, but to enable 
such a choice some minimum amount of 
negative liberty must necessarily exist for 
such a choice to be possible. For many 
the freedom from interference to choose 
is an important aspect of their cultural 
identity. In many Western countries, 
negative liberty, such as the negative liberty 
that does not interfere with choice, is a 
hallmark of democratic citizenship and 
individualism; however, is negative liberty 
necessary for choice, and more importantly 
is it a necessary attribute of value pluralism? 
The fact that negative liberty is held by 
so many is not sufficient justification to 
grant it a privileged position; consensus 
does not entail truth. Additionally, what 
is often thought of as a consensus in the 
value of negative liberty is merely an 
illusion. Negative liberty may be held in 
common by all, but individuals may differ 
in its specific application. Value pluralism 
describes how values can conflict, but it 
provides no valuable tool to determine one 
value over the other. Liberal pluralists who 
claim negative liberty is entailed by value 
pluralism are merely granting the value a 
status separate from other values based on 
a firm conviction. The choice argument 
used to defend this position is not sufficient 
because negative liberty is not necessary 
for choice and in some cases may actually 
restrict choice. Though a minimum degree 
of negative liberty may be ideal to most 
people, it is not a necessary component 
of value pluralism. Value pluralism posits 
that there may be many ways to express 
human flourishing, but it does not set any 
requirements. 
How then are we to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable political 
organization? While this specific question 
is beyond the scope of my research, it may 
be that value pluralism has nothing much 
to say about what is or is not acceptable. If 
no value can be put in a position by which 
we judge action as I argue in my paper, 
then we may only be able to acknowledge 
value pluralism as a multiplicity of 
values and the necessary sacrifice of some 
values. Further research in this area of 
philosophy is important because a better 
understanding of how values work in 
political organizations may be able to help 
reduce conflict by identifying where clashes 
fundamentally exists.
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